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Abstract: International organizations, including the United Nations, have worked 
hard to brand gender equality as a tool for attaining long lasting peace (Bell and Rourke 
2010). These efforts have persisted for decades, notably gaining traction with the passage 
of Security Resolution 1325 by the United Nations (Cohn 2008). Current studies on 
women and peace have found empirical evidence to support the argument that women’s 
inclusion and consideration in peacebuilding leads to a greater likelihood of peace and a 
lasting agreement (Stone 2015; Krause, Krause, Branfors 2018). Scholarship argues that 
women are good for peace because women bring a greater emphasis to the needs of 
civilians and vulnerable groups (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Badulescu 2017). This 
underlying causal mechanism for the relationship between women and sustainable peace 
is widely recognized, but has not been empirically tested in the literature (Paffenholz et 
al. 2018). In fact, qualitative research on women’s involvement in peace negotiations 
asserts that women’s ability to influence the process is heavily limited in most cases 
studied (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I evaluate the commonly accepted 
explanation for the positive effects women have on peace with the following research 
question, “How do women influence the content of peace agreements?”  
I evaluate the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and the 
number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. I examine the relationship 
between women and agreement provisions with a sample of 906 peace agreements from 
32 individual peace processes over the course of twenty years (1990-2010), using a 
negative binomial regression analysis. I do not expect to find a strong correlation 
between women’s presence in negotiation roles, defined as the number of women present 
at the negotiation, and the number of peace agreement provisions pertaining to human 
rights and women’s rights. Rather than numbers, a major mediating factor is whether 
women have influence on the process, measured by the ability for women negotiators to 
speak, vote, and actively participate in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 
2016).  I conduct a qualitative analysis to demonstrate the applicability of my theory, 
using peace processes as illustrative examples of the mediating effects of influence on the 
relationship between women negotiators on women and peace.
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 International organizations, including the United Nations, have worked hard to brand 
gender equality as a tool for attaining long lasting peace (Ellerby 2017; Bell and Rourke 2010). 
These efforts have persisted for decades, notably gaining traction with the passage of Security 
Resolution 1325 by the United Nations (Cohn 2008; Tryggestad 2009). This resolution repeatedly 
emphasized the importance for state leaders to incorporate women and women’s interests in 
peacebuilding, arguing that women’s inclusion is an essential component of sustainable peace 
(UNSCR 1325 2000; Tryggestad 2009). Current studies on women and peace have found 
empirical evidence to support the argument that women’s inclusion and consideration in 
peacebuilding leads to a greater likelihood of peace and a lasting agreement (Stone 2015; Krause, 
Krause, Branfors 2018). Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women bring 
a greater emphasis to the needs of civilians and vulnerable groups (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and 
Badulescu 2017). This underlying causal mechanism for the relationship between women and 
sustainable peace is widely recognized, but has not been empirically tested in the literature 
(Paffenholz et al. 2018; Ellerby 2017). In fact, qualitative research on women’s involvement in 
peace finds that women have very limited influence in most cases studied, making it unlikely that 
women could increase the consideration of any interests in peace (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016).  I evaluate the commonly 
accepted explanation for the positive effects women have on peace with the following research 
question, “How do women influence the content of peace agreements?”
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This study aims to evaluate the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and 
the number of peace agreement provisions that pertain to human rights and gendered interests. 
The scholarship on women and peace have provided many compelling arguments to support that 
women are more likely to support and consider human rights and women’s interests (de La Rey 
and Mckay 2006; El-Bushra 2007). However, I do not expect to find a strong correlation between 
women’s presence in negotiation roles, defined as the number of women present at the 
negotiation, and the number of peace agreement provisions pertaining to human rights and 
women’s rights. Rather than numbers, a major mediating factor is whether women have influence 
on the process, measured by the ability for women negotiators to speak, vote, and actively 
participate in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Regardless of the proportion 
of votes held by women negotiators, I expect that the preferences of women negotiators will not 
translate into the content of agreements. This is because it is highly unlikely that women 
negotiators will be able to vote, or push for the inclusion of issues on the negotiation agenda 
(O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016).  
Pulling from case studies, I argue that women’s ability to influence peace processes is hindered 
by exclusionary practices from their male counterparts (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 
2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I theorize that actors will conduct 
exclusionary practice due to gender bias, and that these widely held normative ideas about 
differences between genders persist (Ellerby 2017). However, I theorize that women can exploit 
these same traditional views and cultural norms responsible for their exclusion, as a means to 
justify their inclusion in peace processes and other processes of decision-making (Paffenholz et 
al. 2018; Ellerby 2017). I outline three different mechanisms in my theory, where women use 
normative expectations of gender to gain access and exercise high levels of influence in peace 
negotiations. I will test my expectations for women’s participation in negotiations by 
quantitatively analyzing the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and numbers of 
peace agreement provisions on human rights and gendered interests. After showing that the 
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relationship between women and peace agreement provisions is weak, I use illustrative examples 
in a qualitative analysis to provide evidence to support my theory that the lack of correlations 
between numbers of women and provisions is caused by mediating effects from the level of 








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature on women’s participation in peace presents inconsistent and unclear 
depictions of the effects women have on peace, and the mechanisms in which women negotiators 
can overcome barriers to women’s inclusion (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and 
Riveros-Morales 2019). I begin by explaining the inconsistencies in the different theoretical 
propositions behind women’s positive effects on peace (Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000; Rehn 
and Sirleaf 2002; Stone 2015). Scholarship argues that women have positive effects on peace 
many reasons, including assertions that women are naturally more peaceful, women are more 
inclined to prefer peace due to their increased vulnerability, and that women are more likely to 
promote human rights and gendered interests (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Charlesworth 
2008; Caprioli 2000). I focus on the argument that the women are good for peace because they 
are more likely to promote human rights and gendered interests, because this is the most widely 
recognized argument in the literature (Stone 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014; Krause, Krause, 
and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). I then provide a summary of the literature 
to justify my approach and reasoning behind testing the relationship between women negotiators 






Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women are naturally more 
peaceful (Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000). This argument asserts that women are naturally less 
competitive and more compassionate, making women more inclined to want peace than men 
(Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000). The theory stipulates that women’s nature and their role as 
mothers and caretakers makes women more caring and concerned for others (Gilligan 1979; 
Caprioli 2000). It is problematic to argue that adding women to peace negotiations is essential for 
peace, because this places the responsibility of conflict resolution on women (Ellerby 2017). The 
assertion that biology and societal role is to blame for men not pushing for peace at the same rate 
as women does not hold men accountable for failing to prioritize conflict resolution over 
competition and personal gains (Caprioli 2000; Charlesworth 2008; Ellerby 2017). Apart from 
this problematic point of view, case studies have shown many examples in which women begin 
advocating for peace as an act of desperation, not out of compassion (Buchanan et al. 2012; 
Paffenholz et al. 2016; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). For example, women in Somaliland originally 
rallied in support for the Somali Civil war (1990-1994) (Paffenholz et al. 2016). However, 
women negotiators and women’s peace organizations quickly shifted their efforts to push for 
peace rather than the continuation of conflict when violence escalated as a product of the Somali 
Civil War, and began occurring between more groups that were previously cooperative 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women promoting peace in Somaliland’s Civil War (1990-1994) were 
not motivated by their peaceful or compassionate nature, but rather as a means to seek protection 
and safety from a violent and dangerous situation (El-Bushra 2007; Paffenholz et al. 2016; 
Charlesworth 2008).   
Vulnerability 
Second, women’s inclination to support peace is also theorized to be caused by women’s 
vulnerability in conflict (Caprioli 2000; Ellerby 2017; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Scholarship and 
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documents passed by the United Nations, claim that women are more likely to push for conflict 
resolution because women face comparatively greater levels of economic insecurity and 
sexual/physical violence during conflict (Radu and Badulescu 2017; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; 
Caprioli 2000; UNSC 1325). Research on women’s experiences in conflict has found universally 
high rates of sexual violence and death in women in conflict situations (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). 
However, women’s experiences and preferences are dependent on their identities, shaped by their 
class, race, ethic group, sexual orientation etc. (Ellerby 2017; Paffenholz et al. 2016). These 
differences in women’s identities will cause women to prefer conflict when it benefits the identity 
group most important to the individual woman (Charleswoth 2008; Caprioli 2000; Krause, 
Krause, and Branfors 2018; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). As a result, we see some women engaging in 
combat and acting to escalate conflict when it coincides with their needs (Charlesworth 2008). In 
Papua New Guinea’s Bougainville (2000) peace process, people native to the island of 
Bougainville became hostile in response to increased immigration of other ethnic groups to the 
island (El-Bushra 2007; Buchanan et al. 2012). Women from the Bougainville Island distracted 
troops from Papua New Guinea by inviting soldiers to play volleyball (Buchanan et al. 2012; 
Hermkerns 2007). This was a tactical ruse that allowed the resistance army to carry out the Kangu 
Beach Massacre (1996), a brutal attack on Papua New Guinea’s defense force (Charlesworth 
2008; Buchanan et al. 2012; Hermkerns 2007). This is an example of women choosing to escalate 
violence and conflict, rather than the pursuit of peace due to women’s preferences informed by 
ethnic identities. 
Human Rights and Gendered Interests 
Third, scholars argue that women should be included in peace negotiations because 
women have their own unique role in the community, and are more in touch with problems on the 
ground (Radu and Baldulescu 2017; Reilly 2007; de La Rey and Mckay 2006). In conflict, men 
often make up the majority of combatants, giving women more responsibility in the home, 
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workforce, and community (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Baldulescu 2017). For example, the 
Darfur peace talks of 2006 originally only featured some political elites and rebel diaspora 
groups. Women from refugee camps were granted a seat at the table after some pushing from, 
third party mediator, Senator S.B. Jaffer (Paffenholz et al. 2016). These women were a great 
resource to the peace process because these women refugees knew much more about the needs of 
the civilian population than the other actors involved (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The resulting peace 
agreement from the talks in Abuja featured many provisions centered on advancing human rights 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016). Scholars argue that the unique roles and experiences women have during 
conflict make women more connected and aware of the most pressing concerns in terms of 
human rights and women’s rights, because women make up the majority of civilians and leaders 
in the community (True and Riveros-Morales 2019; El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Baldulescu 2017; 
Reilly 2007). I focus on the argument that women’s inclusion leads to a greater consideration for 
human rights and gendered interests, because this is the most widely recognized explanation for 
the positive effects women have on peace (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-
Morales 2019; Stone 2015; de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Radu and Badulescu 2017). 
Research on Women and Peace 
The argument that women increase the consideration of human rights and gendered 
interests is used to explain the finding that women have positive effects on peace in quantitative 
studies (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). A 
main approach in the research on women and peace, utilizes quantitative methods to compare the 
duration and likelihood of peace of peace processes with women negotiators to peace processes 
that do not have women negotiators (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-
Morales 2019; Stone 2015). This method does not account for linear effects of numbers of 
women negotiators because it looks at women’s participation categorically rather than 
continuously. Meaning that this method does not account for how different amounts of women 
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negotiators can have more or less of an impact on peace. Additionally, the limited data on women 
negotiators and signatories causes authors to use a very small sample, with the average number of 
cases used ranging from 50-100 agreements (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and 
Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). To gain some perspective on how this may not be 
representative, the largest database on peace has about 1,500 peace agreements signed from 1900-
2016, which is the time-frame typically represented in these quantitative studies (Krause, Krause, 
and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). The findings of these studies 
almost exclusively show that peace processes involving women acting as negotiators are more 
likely to have peace, longer lasting peace, and the inclusion of women’s interests than peace 
processes without women (Stone 2015; Swiss and Anderson 2014; Ellerby 2013; Krause, Krause, 
and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). However, the causal mechanism used to 
explain women’s positive effects on peace lacks empirical support (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 
2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). Little research on the relationship between 
women and human rights has been conducted, but studies on gendered interests have found 
empirical support to indicate that peace processes with women have more provisions on gendered 
interests (True and Morales-Riveros 2019; Domingo et al. 2015; Swiss and Anderson 2014). As 
previously mentioned, these studies lack a sufficient sample size of generalizable results and does 
not describe the linear relationship between women and the inclusion of gendered interests (Stone 
2015; True and Morales-Riveros 2019). 
The largely untested assertion that women increase the consideration for human rights in 
peace becomes especially problematic when you consider the qualitative research on women’s 
experiences in peace processes (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These studies use interviews and surveys and use case 
studies to determine how women shaped the peacebuilding process (Paffenholz et al. 2016; 
Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This method allows 
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researchers to find more than just a correlation between the presence of women and peace, but 
rather offer more evidence of women’s actual contributions to the peace process were. Results 
from these studies showed that women’s participation in peace processes is often severely 
limited, and that women are often excluded from important decision-making discussions 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).  
This calls into question the assertion that women could have caused more support for human 
rights and women’s interests in peace processes, because women negotiators are often unable to 
exert influence on peace negotiations (Paffenholz et al. 2016;Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). I provided much needed empirical testing of the assertion 
that women increase the consideration for human rights and gendered interests by testing the 
relationship between numbers of women negotiations and peace agreement provisions on these 
topics. 
Why are Peace Agreement Provisions Important? 
The most common and observable method for determining the extent to which human 
rights and gendered interests are considered during peace is through the content of peace 
agreements (Bell and Rourke 2010; Ellerby 2013; Swiss and Anderson 2014; True and Morales-
Riveros 2019). While issues included in the content of peace agreements are not a guarantee that 
they will be addressed in practice, the issues prioritized in these documents are more likely to be 
implemented in post-conflict situations than those that are not included (Cohn 2008; Bell and 
Rourke 2010). Peace agreements have been argued to be especially important because it is the 
first step in which the new political, economic and social systems of a country after conflict 
(Ellerby 2013). When peace agreement provisions focus on human rights and gendered interests, 
they can address the underlying causes of the conflict and the grievances resulting from the war. 
This is often defined as positive peace, which involves more than just getting a conflict to end, 
but rather the act of sustaining peace (Lederach 1997; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 
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2016; Reilly 2007). The history of violence can heighten tensions between groups and the 
scarcity of resources can result in levels of insecurity high enough to motivate vulnerable groups 
to reengage in conflict as a defense (Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016).  
Governments can build trust amongst civilians and potential insurgents by respecting and serving 
the needs of the whole population (Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). Peace 
agreements can promote positive peace by building democratic institutions, creating programs to 
distribute resources to marginalized groups, and establish disarmament procedures (Ellerby 2013; 
Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). These mechanisms increase the durability of 
peace by creating political institutions and social systems that cater to the needs of the entire 
population (Lederach 1997).  
Actors in these negotiations determine which groups benefit most in terms of allocation 
of power, protection, and resources (Ellerby 2013). Peace agreements can support women’s 
specific interests by including provisions that improve conditions for women by increasing their 
political, economic, and social rights (Ellerby 2013; True and Morales-Riveros 2019). In addition, 
peace agreement provisions can improve women’s security by outlawing domestic and sexual 
violence (Ellerby 2013; True and Morales-Riveros 2019). For example, peace agreement 
provisions in Rwanda’s Arusha Accords established ad hoc tribunals (Anderlini 2014). These 
tribunals were designed to ensure that crimes of sexual violence were charged and prosecuted as 
crimes against humanity, and greatly reduced acts of gender based violence (Anderlini 2014).  
Human rights can be supported in agreement provisions that support vulnerable groups, 
establish programs to offer aid and assistance, and build trust between civilians and the ruling 
sovereign body (de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Jansen 2006). For example, provisions within the 
Chapultepec agreement in El Salvador (1992), established a reintegration program for the former 
rebel combatants, ultimately bolstering the durability of peace (Conway, Martinez, and Gammage 
2004; Anderlini 2014). This reintegration program reduced lowered the capabilities of the rebel 
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group to conduct an insurgent attack by incentivizing participation in a disarmament and 
demobilization program with compensation (Conway, Martinez and Gammage 2004; Anderlini 
2014). Immediately after the resolution of the conflict, the reintegration program provided 
members of the insurgent group with land, mental and physical health care, and other basic 
human needs (Conway, Martinez and Gammage 2004; Anderlini 2014). The agreement protected 
once marginalized groups, and integrated excluded individuals back into society. By ensuring the 
protections, freedom, and security of once vulnerable groups, the Chapultepec Accord built trust 
and raised the cost of rebellion (Lederach 1997; Conway, Martinez and Gammage 2004; Gates, 
Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). 
What Does it Mean for Women to Influence Peace Negotiations? 
I argue that influence will mediate the relationship between numbers of women 
negotiators and numbers of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. The literature 
defines influence as the ability for women’s groups and networks to push for their own 
preferences on the agenda before, during, or after the negotiation (Paffenholz et al. 2018). This 
also includes women’s groups’ ability to push for negotiations to begin or for agreements to be 
signed. Counting the number of women serving as negotiators is not enough to measure the extent 
to which women can influence peace agreements (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). 
This is because opposition to women’s inclusion amongst the public and their male counterparts 
in the negotiation can prevent women from influencing the peace process (Paffenholz 2014; 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These actors can prevent women from being able 
to push for human rights and women’s interests by imposing threats, having closed-door 
meetings, and by refusing to consider contributions from women negotiators during agenda 
setting or decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Paffenholz 2014; Buchanan et al. 
2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).  Without being able to speak, vote, or 
actively participate in the peace process, it is unlikely that women will be able to increase 
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consideration of any issue. I predict that women’s level of influence is important to women 
shaping peace agreement content, but how do women gain influence on peace? 
How Do You Ensure Women are Influential in Peace Agreements? 
The literature proposes a number of mechanisms to increase women’s level of influence 
in peace processes (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016; 
Paffenholz et. al 2018). These mechanisms alter structural factors of the peace process to 
accomplish one of three things. First, is to increase the number of women in the peace process. 
The number of women in a peace process can increase when political elite involved in the 
negotiation advocate for women’s inclusion. In peace talks in Burundi (1996), Mediator Julius 
Nyerere negotiated and pushed for the incorporation of women’s groups in the process 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This effort afforded very little influence to women 
in the negotiation because the request faced a lot of opposition. Eventually, women were granted 
observer status as a compromise and lacked actual decision-making authority in the process 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). Another predicted method for increasing the 
number of women in peace negotiations is to incorporate women in the early and less exclusive 
phases (Paffenholz et al. 2018) This can set a precedent for women’s involvement in peace 
processes, and lead to more women being included in later stages (Paffenholz et al. 2018; 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Although research has found a correlation 
between early women’s involvement and the number of women negotiators, it is far more likely 
that processes with more women involved in both these stages occurred because there was less 
opposition to women’s inclusion (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The most common method for 
increasing the number of women in a peace process is the implementations of a quota or 
minimum requirement of female delegates in the process (Paffenholz et al. 2018). This 
mechanism will only cause an increase in women’s influence if women are allowed to vote and 
speak in the negotiation process. For example, in the Bangsamoro Peace Process in The 
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Philippines (2014), the state leader granted 50% of negotiator to women (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, 
and Paffenholz 2015). This was a symbolic gesture from the Philippines to gain legitimacy and 
financial support from the United Nations during their peace process (Paffenholz et al. 2016). It 
was evident that no real effort was being made to improve gender equality, and the male 
delegates excluded women from the voting process by having closed door meetings (Paffenholz 
et al. 2016). This mechanism will not ultimately cause women to be influential, because it only 
changes the composition of gendered institutions and leaves the gendered cultures and individuals 
in place (Ellerby 2017). 
The second type of mechanisms predicted to increase women’s influence aims to make 
women more capable negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). International 
organizations and women’s groups can increase public pressure for increasing the number of 
women by acting as support structures (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These 
organizations support women by hosting workshops, which publicly highlights women’s 
preparation and training to act as a negotiator. International actors like the United Nations 
incentivize women’s inclusion in peace processes by providing financial assistance and equating 
this effort with democracy and legitimacy (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Cohn 2008). State leaders and 
political elites may often include women in peace negotiations as symbolic gesture to signal 
commitment to women’s equality, but will not act to ensure women’s influence or make any 
effort to share power (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). In 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sun City Talks (2002), UNIFEM (United Nations 
Development Fund for Women) organized workshops to better prepare women to serve as 
negotiators, and in increase in negotiators did occur (Paffenholz et al. 2016).  When public 
pressure and international organization involvement increases, it is very likely that state leaders 
might opt to include more women as a gesture. This gesture however will not likely coincide with 
an acceptance in women’s presence from their counterparts or the public, meaning that the 
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exclusion may continue through informal practices that aren’t as visible or documented. The 
women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also experienced informal barriers, and resorted 
to blocking the exits of the negotiation room as an effort to get the peace agreement signed 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016). 
The third type of proposed mechanisms ensure women’s influence by regulating 
communication in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). 
This is done by the implementation of decision-making procedures, which ensure equal 
participation and voting privileges for all negotiators. Male delegates opposed to women’s 
inclusion in peace negotiations can get around this mechanism by holding closed-door meetings 
or ignoring the votes and issues presented by women negotiators. An alternative method to ensure 
women’s ability to communicate in negotiators is through transfer strategies. Women’s groups 
can write position papers, or documents written to outline issues of importance, which should be 
incorporated in peace agreements (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Transfer strategies ensure that these 
documents written by women’s groups are circulated to the delegates within the peace negotiation 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This strategy may make women more able to 
reach negotiators but it will not make their male counterparts more willing to listen to what 
women have to say during peace negotiation talks. I argue that that these proposed variables act 
as “megaphones,” or mechanisms that allow women to communicate more clearly and be heard 
by other representatives. Following assertions in the literature, I predict that women’s influence is 
limited due to opposition from their male counterparts and the public (Paffenholz et al. 2016; 
Buchanan et al. 2012). These proposed “megaphone” mechanisms are not what causes women to 
influence peace processes, because they do not address the preferences and beliefs held by the 
public and male delegates involved in the process. These long held beliefs about differences 
between men and women are hard to overcome. However, the literature has provided evidence 
that these normative expectations can be reframed or exploited by women to bolster their 
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influence on peace negotiations (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 
2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). I introduce the mechanisms in which women are able to use these 







My goal for this paper is to evaluate and explain the relationship between women’s 
descriptive representation in negotiations and the number of resulting agreement provisions that 
pertain to human rights and gendered interests. In this section, I theorize that women’s level of 
influence will have large mediating effects on the relationship between women negotiators and 
peace agreements. As a result, I do not expect to find a strong positive correlation 
between women’s presence in negotiation roles and the number of provisions pertaining to human 
rights and women’s rights (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016; 
Buchanan et al. 2012). I argue that these interests held by women negotiators will not be 
translated into most agreements because most women negotiators are unable to speak or vote 
during the process (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016; 
Buchanan et al. 2012). After arguing for the importance of influence, I explain what differentiates 
the peace processes in which women are unable to participate from the negotiations where 
women can exercise influence on the content of peace agreements. I wrap up my theory section 
by introducing three different mechanisms in which women can overcome opposition to their 
inclusion and push for the inclusion of human rights and gendered interests.  
Women want to increase the number of peace agreement provisions on human rights and 
women’s interests. I theorize that women in particular will push for the inclusion of women’s 
rights and human rights in peace agreements for several reasons. The first possible reason is that 
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women negotiators may vote for gendered interests and human rights issues because it is 
in their best interest and therefore a rational decision (El-Bushra 2007; de La Rey and Mckay 
2006).  
I assume that actors included in peace negotiations are self-interested, meaning that they 
will support issues and direct resources to groups they identify with. Women are likely to have 
similar interests based on their experiences in conflict situations. The United Nations Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women commissioned an assessment of the impact 
armed conflict has on women, the report provided compelling evidence to support that there are 
universal themes and adversities faced by women in conflict all over the world. (El-Bushra 2007; 
Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Conflict primarily occurs in less developed countries, where women are 
already disadvantaged because of a lack of authority, financial opportunity, and from a greater 
acceptance of sexual violence (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; El-Bushra 2007). In addition to gender 
based violence, conflict impacts women by causing a hindrance to resource access, disruption of 
services, and loss of financial contributions from any male members within the household (Jansen 
2006). The majority of deaths for women in conflict occur because of disease and malnutrition 
(Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). These deaths are attributed to conflict rather than nature because conflict 
creates a culture of abuse for human rights and amplifies existing inequalities for marginalized 
groups (Jansen 2006; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002).  
Second, women are less likely to become combatants in conflict (El-Bushra 2007; de La 
Rey and Mckay 2006). With the majority of the male population absent from the home, women 
take on more responsibility in the home, workforce, and community (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and 
Badulescu 2017). Women make up the majority of civilians, making them more likely to be 
aware of and connected to human rights issues (de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Radu and Badulescu 
2017). It is important to note that women do not all have the same interests and experiences 
(Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2018). I do not assume that all women negotiators will be 
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interested in supporting what has been defined as “gendered interests” (Cohn 2008). However, I 
pull from existing literature to explain additional incentives for women negotiators to support 
human rights and gendered interests regardless of their own prerogatives (Krause, Krause and 
Branfors 2018; Paffenholz et al. 2018). Women negotiators may vote for human rights and gender 
issues in order to build public support for their inclusion and for the peace process overall 
(Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). Women negotiators can foster more support from society by 
forming “linkages” with women’s civil society groups (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). 
These groups are unified on gendered interests and humanitarian reform, and inform women 
negotiators of which issues are important to the public (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). 
Women negotiators have an incentive to push for greater numbers of provisions pertaining to 
human rights and gendered interests in order to gain more support for their inclusion and the 
peace process overall (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). This connection and support system 
between negotiators and civil society groups are unlikely to be formed if women cannot influence 
the peace negotiation, as these civil society groups would have little incentive to support the 
women negotiators (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018).  
Just because women want to increase the number of provisions on human rights and 
peace agreements does not mean that women negotiators can influence the content of peace 
agreements (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz 
2014). Pulling from other studies, I conceptualize women’s influence as the ability for negotiators 
to place issues on the agenda, vote, and participate in decision-making discussions, and push for a 
negotiation to begin or end by signing the agreement (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Current scholarship on women’s participation in peace 
processes notes common occurrences of exclusionary practices to women negotiators, which 
occurs due to opposition from political elites and the public (Ellerby 2012; Paffenholz et al. 
2016). The observed trend in aversion to women’s inclusion in peace processes amongst political 
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elites often leads to closed door meetings, threats, and a lack of consideration for the interests 
supported by women negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 
2015). Male political elites are likely to hold larger shares in terms of political rights, power, and 
wealth, giving them a rational incentive to use their power to maintain their larger share of the 
benefits (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). As a result, some political elites may choose to exclude or 
refrain from allocating rights and resources to other groups. This is a viable option for political 
elites because of their higher levels of power and influence compared to other marginalized 
groups (Ellerby 2017). Case studies seem to indicate that women negotiators are far more likely 
to be elite comparatively in status, and thus will share more common interests with the general 
public (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 
2015). In processes in which women do not share commonalities with the public in terms of class, 
I argue that elite women negotiators are more likely to support the interests of marginalized 
groups because of their connection to women’s peace groups. Other studies have found in 
interviews that women’s activist groups can foster public support for women’s inclusion in 
exchange for support of the issues favored by the group (Kraus, Kraus, and Branfors 2018; Jansen 
2006; de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Radu and Baldulescu 2017). Women negotiators are more 
likely to connect with local groups over their counterparts, male political elites, because they are 
in greater need of support and legitimacy due the resistance typically met with women’s inclusion 
(Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2018; Kraus, Kraus, and Branfors 2018).  
Other studies have found many instances in which the participation of women negotiators 
in peace processes is substantially limited by opposition from society and their male counterparts, 
I predict that my sample will have similar frequencies of peace processes in which women cannot 
vote or speak (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015). As a result, I argue that the high frequency of exclusionary practices will limit 
the extent to which women can push for the inclusion of human rights and gendered interests in 
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peace agreements. While I am not predicting that women negotiators will not be able exercise 
influence on peace agreements in every peace negotiation, I expect the large amount of cases in 
my sample with influential women negotiators will cause my large quantitative study to yield 
results indicating a weak relationship overall.  
Hypothesis: The number of women negotiators will not have positive or significant effects 
on the number of peace agreement provisions that pertain to gendered interests and human 
rights.  
I have just argued that the effect of the numbers of women negotiators on peace 
agreements depends on the level of influence women negotiators have on the peace process. I 
predict that most cases in the sample will show instances in which women are unable to 
participate, causing results to show a weak relationship between these two variables. While I am 
not predicting for this to be a dominant occurrence in my sample, case studies have shown many 
instances in which women have been able to influence negotiations (Paffenholz et al. 2016; 
Buchanan et al. 2012; de La Rey and Mckay 2006). Given that influence is what allows women 
negotiators to change the content of peace agreements and utilize their strength in numbers, it is 
important to understand what differentiates the processes where women are excluded from 
decision-making in peace process from the negotiations where women can influence the process. 
As outlined in the literature review, many of these studies argue that changes to structural aspects 
of the peace process will allow women to exercise influence over the peace process (Paffenholz et 
al. 2018; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016). I argue that these 
proposed mechanisms, or “megaphones” will not maximize women’s ability to engage in peace 
negotiations. This is because these mechanisms simply allow women to speak more freely or be 
present during discussions, but they do not increase the likelihood that women’s votes and 
opinions will be considered by their male counterparts. The best long-term solution for women 
negotiators to gain influence in peace processes would be for these long held cultural biases 
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against women’s inclusion in leadership roles and the public sector to be discarded amongst elites 
and society alike (Ellerby 2017).  However, most countries are far from foregoing their ideas 
about gender differences and from embracing women as equal counterparts to men (Ellerby 
2017). I assert that gender bias motivates actors to exclude women from decision making 
decisions, but I do not claim that women must change these normative expectations of gender in 
order to influence peace.  In contrast, I argue that women negotiators are able to use these more 
traditional perceptions of gender to their advantage. I classify three different mechanisms in 
which this could be accomplished, based on my own observations of instances in which women 
negotiators exploit gender roles. 
1. Vulnerability 
2. Expectations of Modesty 
3. Emphasizing their Unique Role 
First, women negotiators can exert influence on peace negotiations by using perceptions 
of vulnerability to their advantage. In peace talks in Somalia (1993), women in the negotiation 
room were not granted the ability to vote, harshly limiting their ability to influence the peace 
process. However, women delegates were able to pressure their male counter parts to sign the 
peace agreement by publicly going on a hunger strike until a peace agreement was signed 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women were able to successfully pressure negotiators due to the 
negative attention, which caused public concerns for the women’s safety to arise (Paffenholz et 
al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). Second, women exploit normative expectations of women’s 
modesty. Forty women delegates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were able to block the 
exits of the negotiation room and imprison the remaining 502 male delegates in the negotiation 
room until the peace agreement was signed (Paffenholz et al. 2016). This effort was successful 
because of cultural stigmas associated with touching women (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women 
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have even proved to be influential on peace from outside the negotiation room, in Somaliland 
(1993), women threatened to publicly undress in full view of the negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 
2016). These efforts from women in peace activist groups led to the signing and incorporation of 
human rights issues in the resulting agreement (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, 
and Paffenholz 2015). The last method, women overcome opposition to their inclusion by 
emphasizing women’s “unique role” in home and community. Women negotiators in Papua New 
Guinea branded themselves as “mothers of the land” to gain access to the negotiation room and to 
build trust with both sides of the conflict (Hermkerns 2007 pp 12). By embracing long-term held 
values and beliefs held by the actors responsible for limiting women’s influence on peace 
processes, women are able to convince or coerce the actors responsible for limiting women’s 
influence to allow their active participation in the peace process (Hermkerns 2007; Buchanan et 
al. 2012). By using these three mechanisms, small numbers of women negotiators and women 
from outside of the negotiation room can influence peace processes.  
I theorize that the numbers of women in negotiations will largely be unimportant to 
describing which peace agreements have large amounts of provisions on human rights and 
gendered interests. While there is strength in numbers of likeminded delegates within any voting 
body, a place at the table is not enough for women to add their own preferences to the agenda 
(Ellerby 2013; Paffenholz et al. 2018). I argue that the exclusionary practices women face are a 
product of opposition to women’s incorporation into roles outside of the home. My theory differs 
from other works on women’s experiences in negotiations by arguing that structural changes to 
biased institutions will not be enough (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015). I theorize that the same biased individuals and informal practices will remain, 
preventing women from being able to shape the content of peace agreements (Ellerby 2017). In 
my next section, I outline my two step methodological approach to support this theory. I begin by 
testing my theory that opposition to women’s participation will be high in terms of frequency by 
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quantitatively evaluating the relationship between number of women negotiators and numbers of 
provisions on human rights and gendered interests. Subsequently, I conduct a qualitative analysis, 
using illustrative examples to demonstrate the shortcomings of previously proposed mechanisms 
for allowing women to influence the process. I use this analysis to provide support for my theory 
that women can exploit normative expectations, by outlining occurrences in which women 
utilized the three different mechanisms classified in this section. I aim to use these illustrative 
examples to show that the ability for women to speak and vote in negotiations is essential for 







In this analysis, I aim to explain the relationship of women’s descriptive representation in 
peace negotiations on the number of human rights provisions and the representation of gendered 
interests in peace agreements. My first objective in this analysis is to evaluate this relationship 
statistically. I use a negative binomial regression analysis to evaluate the effect the percentage of 
woman negotiators has on the number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. This 
specific type of regression is well suited to my data, because my sample is comprised of over-
dispersed data, that counts the number of times the incidence of human rights and gendered 
provisions occurs in peace agreements (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987).  
My unit of analysis for this study is peace agreements. This is because each peace 
agreement has a measurable number of women negotiators and a measureable number of peace 
agreement provisions, which can be categorized into gendered interests or human rights. The 
literature defines “peace process” to include all negotiations and peace agreements that aim to 
resolve the same conflict (Bell and Rourke 2010). My sample includes 906 peace agreements 
from 32 peace processes that were signed from 1990-2016, and were found in the PA-X Peace 
Agreement Database (2017). A full list of all the peace processes included in my sample can be 
found in Table 7 in the appendix. The conflicts included in my sample are intrastate conflicts, this 
is conflict occurring between a state and an entity within the same country rather than conflict 
between two countries. Some of the conflict resolutions lead to the formation of a new country
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including Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and South Sedan. State data used in cases 
where the country associated with the conflict had not been formed yet was collected from the 
state in which new state emerged from.  
This practice will allow me to use data that best describes the socioeconomic conditions 
for all actors involved in the conflict because actors on both sides of the conflict were subject to 
the conditions and rulings of the state that originally covered both territories (Bell and Rourke 
2010: Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). The new state 
resulting from the conflict was unlikely to have unique cultural or socioeconomic conditions 
because individuals belonging to this territory lacked sovereignty until the rebels or insurgent 
population gained independence and formed a new state (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018; 
True and Riveros-Morales 2019).  
I argue that my sample is representative of the total population for several reasons. First, 
The United Nations found that all peace processes from 1992-2011 had an average of nine 
percent of women negotiators, and my sample has the same average of woman negotiators 
between the 32 peace processes included (UN Women 2012). Second, my samples distribution 
and amount of provisions on human rights and gendered interests is consistent with what we 
know about the total population of peace agreements from 1990-2016. It is not possible to access 
the content of the total population of peace agreements written 1990-2016, so I reference other 
works on the content of peace agreements to determine if my sample is representative of all peace 
agreements written at this time (Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Krause, 
Krause, and Branfors 2018). I use this because the current research on peace agreement content is 
the only source available to help us understand how often peace agreements include human rights 
and gendered interests (Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Krause, Krause, 
and Branfors 2018). Only fifty percent of peace agreements in my sample have any mention of 
gendered interests, I argue this is representative of all peace agreements because other works 
26 
 
reported a range from 43 percent to 65 percent of peace agreements with references to women 
(Ellerby 2013; Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Ellerby 2016). It is also 
likely that my sample reflects trends of growth in provisions on human and women’s rights, 
because my sample and other research found a large increase in such provisions after the passage 
of the United Nations’ Security Resolution 1325 in 2000 (Ellerby 2013; Bell and Rourke 2010; 
True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Ellerby 2016; UNSCR 1325 2000).  In addition to having the 
same rates of gendered provisions, growth, and women’s participation, my sample also reflects a 
large proportion of the total population of peace agreements signed from 1990-2016. While the 
exact number of peace agreements signed in that time period are unknown, I can argue that my 
sample is large enough to describe the total population because it includes 60 percent of the peace 
agreements listed in the largest existing database on peace agreements (Bell et al. 2017).  
My first dependent variable is the number of human rights provisions within the peace 
agreement, this is a count variable is coded to depict the number of provisions in the peace 
agreement that correspond to human rights issues. I got data on the number of human rights 
provisions for each peace agreement in my sample from the PA-X Peace agreement database 
(2017).  I chose this database because it was the largest and most comprehensive source available 
for information on peace agreement content (Bell et al. 2017). The database codes peace 
agreement provisions as “human rights” related when it includes any references pertaining to 
equality, democracy, protection, civil and political rights, human rights frameworks, socio-
economic rights, etc. The large amount of information available in this database allows me to 
include every peace process with published data on the number of women negotiators involved, 
which gives more confidence in my results. 
My second dependent variable measures the number of peace agreement provisions with 
references to gendered interests, which also comes from the PA-X Gender Peace Agreement 
Database (2017). The database includes any references pertaining to women, gender, and sexual 
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or gender based violence. Provisions coded as “gendered” in the PA-X Gender Database (2017) 
can simply reference women, or have specific provisions meant to address and improve the 
social, political, and economic rights for women. Ellerby (2013) argues that these provisions can 
be categorized in four main types. Gendered provisions can help women by improving their 
incorporation in peace processes, representation in all decision-making levels, protection from 
violence and oppression, and recognition of women’s unique needs and preferences (Ellerby 
2013). I do not differentiate between the different types of provisions that are measured as 
gendered, because I do not expect any unique effects from women’s inclusion on any particular 
type of provision for women’s interests. Despite universal themes in women’s experiences during 
conflict, the unique circumstances of the war and variance between each woman’s preferences 
may make different types of provisions more valuable (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). The differences 
in priorities amongst different actors in peace negotiations makes it impossible to determine 
which type of gendered provisions are more likely to occur or be more favored by actors in the 
process (Ellerby 2013). As previously discussed, some works argue that women rationally push 
for their own interests to be included (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Radu and Badulescu 2017; 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Given that women’s preferences are dependent on 
their own identities and the unique circumstances of conflict, it is impossible to identify which 
type of gendered provisions will be prioritized (Paffenholz et al. 2018). 
My independent variable is women’s participation in peace agreements. I will be 
measuring my independent variable using data on the percentage of women negotiators associated 
with the peace agreements within my sample. Data on the number of women negotiators comes 
from the Council on Foreign Relations (2018) database and reports from the United Nations 
(2017). This will indicate the number of women appointed to formal positions within the 
negotiation room. I did not have access to data on the exact number of women negotiators in all 
906 peace agreements included in my analysis, so I used data on the number of women 
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negotiators from the most comprehensive or important peace agreement in each process for all 
peace agreements belonging to the same peace process (PA-X Peace Agreement Database 2017). 
The decision to enter the same data on women negotiators for every agreement in the same 
process allowed me to increase my sample from 45 peace agreements to 906 peace agreements. 
Literature on women’s participation in peace argues that women’s ability to influence peace is 
influenced by variables outside of numbers, including previous instances of women’s 
involvement and socioeconomic conditions within the country (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This sample size will allow me to include enough control 
variables to isolate the relationship between my independent and dependent variable without over 
specifying the model (Lawless 1987).  
This method could be problematic, because it will measure entire peace processes by the 
number of women negotiators involved in the comprehensive agreement alone. Meaning that 
peace processes with high levels of women negotiators in all 50 agreements in a process, will 
look similar to peace processes that had little to no women involved in the process until the final 
agreement (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014; Domingo et al. 2015). My model 
will have a lesser ability to evaluate this relationship because of the lack of certainty in the 
number of women negotiators in each individual negotiation. I do not expect my use of data for 
only one agreement in a peace process for all associated agreements to hinder the credibility of 
my results, for many reasons. My first reason is based on my theory that women can influence 
agreements from outside and inside the room. While I focus on women’s influence from inside 
the negotiation room, the effects from women’s peace activism and mass action cannot be so 
easily distinguished. Peace processes with high numbers of women negotiators throughout are 
likely to have the same number of women involved as processes that didn’t have women 
negotiators until the final agreement. I base this claim on observations from cases studies that find 
that the late inclusion of women negotiators is often a result of highly effective and strong efforts 
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from women’s advocacy groups outside the room (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).  
Given that an increase in women negotiators during later stages of the process indicates 
that women’s groups were highly active, it is likely that peace processes without a later increase 
had the same numbers of women involved when you consider actors inside and outside the room 
(Paffenholz et al. 2018). If negotiators who gained access in response to the involvement from 
women’s groups cause the inclusion of human rights and gender provisions, then these cases are 
affected by women’s descriptive and direct representation and should be included in my analysis. 
This is because women’s groups were responsible for the inclusion of women in the negotiation 
room. The peace processes with high numbers of women negotiators may not have had the same 
number of women in every agreement, however, the number of women negotiators recorded in 
the data reflect the most critical stage for the development of women’s and human rights in the 
peace process (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). Early agreements, 
like ceasefire agreements, are written to establish procedures and rules for the peace negotiation 
(Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). So, women’s involvement is not as 
important in early agreements of processes because this is not when actors draft and discuss 
provisions on human rights and gendered interests (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Ellerby 
2013). The consideration of human rights and women’s interests occurs in later or more 
comprehensive agreements because these documents are meant to establish new institutions for a 
post-conflict regime (Ellerby 2013). 
Other studies have included different measures for women’s participation in peace 
agreements, using the number of women signatories or mediators in the negotiation (Krause, 
Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). I include measures of 
signatories versus negotiators for each process in the appendix, which shows multiple peace 
processes in which the number of signatories is higher than negotiators. A higher number of 
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signatories indicates that there were more women allowed to sign the agreement, than the number 
of women able to participate in the negotiation. Signatories can often be a symbolic role, where 
women are allowed to sign a peace agreement as a gesture, meaning that women signatories may 
not even be granted access to the negotiation room (Paffenholz et al. 2016).  I predict that 
women’s level of influence will mediate the effects of women’s presence on the number of 
provisions on human and women’s rights. I measure the proportion of women negotiators because 
this position should give women access to the negotiation room and represent the peace processes 
in which women are more likely to be able to vote and speak in peace processes (True and 
Riveros-Morales 2019; Paffenholz et al. 2018). Additionally, mediator and signatory roles are not 
mutually exclusive, meaning that one person may hold both roles in the same negotiation 
(Paffenholz et al. 2018). I aim to test the effects of the number of women in negotiations on peace 
agreement content, so getting an accurate count of the number of women involved is important. I 
can make sure to get an accurate measure of the number of women involved by excluding the 
signatory measure to prevent the same delegate from being counted twice in one negotiation. 
Table 7 in the appendix also shows peace processes with a higher numbers of women negotiators 
than signatories. Case studies suggest that negotiators are unable to sign peace agreements due to 
opposition and exclusion from their male counterparts (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 
2016). In my theory, I argue that women can influence peace negotiations by speaking and 
voting. I use the number of negotiators over signatories because I still expect that women can be 
influential in negotiations without being able to sign the agreement.  
Mediators are third party members and their inclusion occurs in small numbers because 
less mediators are used in the negotiation (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012 O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Women acting as mediators typically belong to a third 
party, not the country associated with the conflict (Buchanan et al. 2012 O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, 
and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). My theory argues that influential women will vote 
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for women’s and human rights because it serves their own interests directly in that country, or 
improves their level of legitimacy as their efforts to push women’s interests incentivizes local 
women’s groups to support the delegate (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). This personal 
incentive to improve local conditions for women or ties to local women’s groups will not be 
applicable to women mediators. Additionally, I aim to explore the mediating effects of influence 
on the relationship between women’s presence in negotiations and provisions on women’s and 
human rights. Women mediators’ ability to exercise most likely differs from the local women 
encapsulated in my theory, because mediators are often recognized political elites. My theory 
argues that opposition to women’s inclusion will limit the extent to which women can influence 
negotiations, eliminating the ability for women to act on their preferences and support human 
rights and gendered interests. Established political elites will have more credibility and are not 
likely to face the same obstacles as local women negotiators. In order to test the applicability of 
my theory that the effects of women’s participation on agreements is dependent on the ability of 
women negotiators to influence the process, I only include a variable for the number of women 
negotiators. 
In addition to my independent variable, I also include several control variables in my 
statistical analysis. As previously mentioned, the type of the peace agreement is a large 
determinant of which issues are covered (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 
2010). Comprehensive and Constitution agreements are written with the intent to establish new 
procedures and institutions, which ultimately leads to a greater likelihood for content to be 
focused on human rights and gendered interests (Ellerby 2013; Bell and Rourke 2010). These 
agreements are given a much more to accomplish than others, because they are meant to cater to 
the needs of civilians and refugees, rather than just create procedures and rules (Krause, Krause, 
and Branfors 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014). To control for potential effects of agreement type 
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on the number of provisions allocated to human and women’s rights, I include an indicator of the 
length of the peace agreement in my analysis. 
I also control for a variable that measures the country’s overall respect for human rights. 
Using data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (2014), I use the empowerment rights index 
(Cigranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). which constructed to reflect the extent to which the 
government supports and allows foreign movements, domestic movements, freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly & association, workers’ rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom of 
religion (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). The database gauges a government’s respect for human 
rights by looking at a government’s practices in response to religious practices, women’s 
inclusion in society, and protest (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). These practices are then rated 
and coded into an index variable for empowerment rights, which ranges from 0 (no government 
respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights) (Cigranelli 
and Richards 2014). This variable measures specifically the government’s respect for human 
rights by combining other variables in the database which describe the extent to which a 
government grants citizens and women personal freedoms. The index includes measures for 
women’s political, social, and economic rights (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). This is especially 
useful because scholars have found that the level of equality between genders is highly related to 
the extent to which women are accepted in leadership or public sector roles outside the home 
(Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Fish 2002). Rather than including all 14 
values as individual levels or variables in my negative binomial regression, I code the variable 
dichotomously. The average score for the entire world and my sample is 8, so I assign all 
countries with values below the average value (scores 0-7) a 0. I code all countries with scores 
about 7 as 1(Cigranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The quantitative results of my negative 
binomial regression analysis will exclude the variable for countries with above average respect 
for human rights (Human Rights=1) because this variable is redundant (Lawless 1987). This 
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variable is redundant because the coefficient for countries below average respect scores for 
human rights (Human Rights=0) will represent the difference in the incident rate for the 
independent variable compared to the reference group (Human Rights=1) (Lawless 1987). This 
method will allow me to compare countries with high respect for human rights with low respect 
and the correlations between these variables with human rights or gendered interests provisions. 
The literature argues that the socioeconomic conditions within a country can increase or 
limit the country’s likelihood to support human rights and women’s interests (Ellerby 2017; True 
and Riveros-Morales 2019; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). I control for possible effects of 
women’s incorporation in the workplace with data from the World Bank (2017) on the percentage 
of women in the labor force compared to men for the country and year associated with signing of 
the peace agreement. Countries with larger amounts of women in the workforce may be more 
inclined to support women’s economic rights and equal treatment overall, and are also more 
likely to have a better economy overall (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Bell and Rourke 2010). This 
could potentially cause a higher number of human rights provisions and gendered interests 
regardless of women’s participation because these countries have more funds and resources to 
support human and women’s rights (Paffenholz et al. 2018). Additionally, countries with a larger 
number of women in the workforce have societies have fewer gender gaps in terms of education, 
rights, and opportunities (Inglehart and Norris 2003).  
When a country already has more women involved in roles outside of the home, then 
concessions for women’s interests and further advancement will be more attainable because it 
requires less compromise (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Ellerby 2017). Countries with less 
disparities between sexes will not need to allocate as much resources and effort to supporting 
women’s equality and opportunities, making support for gendered interests and its inclusion more 
likely in countries with women more active in the workplace rather than the home.  I also control 
for birthrate or the number of births per woman to further capture any potential effects of 
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differences between genders within a country (World Bank 2017; Paffenholz et al. 2018; Swiss 
and Anderson 2014). Countries with economic downturns in conflict may simply have less 
women involved because of job availability. When jobs become scarce, women are often the first 
to be fired or revert back to roles in the home due to societal expectations of men in the 
workforce (Caprioli 2000; Ellerby 2017). Men are also more likely to make more income, 
meaning that households looking to have a parent or worker in the home would rationally choose 
for women to take that role (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Ellerby 2017). 
The inclusion of birth rate accounts for a countries’ previous level of respect for reproductive life 
and indicates levels of equality between gender, as more children typically results in a higher 
likelihood for women to remain in traditional homemaker roles (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rehn 
and Sirleaf 2002; Ellerby 2017). The number of births per woman also describes the rate in which 
women can participate in the community, which can be limited by large numbers of children 
(True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). This is important because I predict that women’s 
roles as leaders in the community leads to women becoming more likely to advocate for human 
rights because of their awareness and connectedness to what the public needs. Previous works on 
women’s participation have found that the passage of a gender quota can indicate a country’s 
greater likelihood to support women’s rights (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Krause, Krause, and 
Branfors 2018; Domingo et al. 2015; Swiss and Anderson 2014). I pull data from the gender 
quota database from the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2016) to measure if the 
country had passed a quota before the peace agreement was signed. Gender quotas are not always 
followed and can be passed as an effort for a country to look more democratic, rather than be an 
effort to improve women’s political inclusion (Ellerby 2017; Domingo et al. 2015).  
To compensate for this, I also control for the percentage of women in the lower of house 
of parliament in the country at the year the peace agreement is signed (Paffenholz et al. 2018; 
Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). I measure for this with data from the World Bank (2017). 
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Countries with a historical precedence of women holding elected office may have a greater 
respect for human rights and women’s interests than countries without an observable amount of 
women involved in government. This variable accounts for differences in opportunities between 
sexes that occur beyond economic conditions. For example, peace agreements from the 
Burundian Civil War peace process had some of the highest numbers of human rights and 
gendered provisions, in addition to a comparatively high birth rate and a low percentage of 
women in the workforce (World Bank 2017). Burundi placed in the top quarter of women’s 
parliamentary representation amongst the other county-years included in my sample, which 
indicates a greater amount of political equality between sexes and a greater likelihood of country 
support overall for women’s rights (World Bank 2017). The parliament variable will indicate the 
higher precedent of women’s involvement in Burundi. This is not indicated by Burundi’s values 
for birth rate and workplace participation, as they both can be influenced by a country’s economic 
state.  
Finally, I recognize in my theory that women do not need to be in the negotiation room to 
influence the content of peace agreements. While women negotiators’ ability to influence peace 
agreement content should be higher than for women acting outside the formal process, studies 
have found that women’s groups can be effective advocates for peace and human rights (Jansen 
2006; Radu and Baldulescu 2017; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I control for potential effects of 
women’s peace activist groups by including a control variable, WINGO. The WINGO variable 
stands for women’s international groups and measures the number of local chapters of 
international women’s groups each associated country has at the year the peace agreement was 
signed. This variable comes from replication data from Hughes et al. (forthcoming) and includes 
data on the number of women’s international groups from every five years. Following the lead of 
other studies, I imputed missing data based on trends in growth and coded this variable 
dichotomously to minimize error. The WINGO variable was coded as 0 if the number of 
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women’s groups in the country at the year the peace agreement is signed is under the median 
value of the total sample, which is 35.4 (Swiss and Anderson 2014). The quantitative results of 
my negative binomial regression analysis will exclude the variable for countries with above the 
median number of women’s groups at the year the peace agreement is signed, rights (Women’s 
Groups=1) because this variable is redundant (Lawless 1987). This variable is redundant because 
the coefficient for countries below the median numbers of women’s groups (Women’s Groups=0) 
will represent the difference in the incident rate for the independent variable compared to the 
reference group (Women’s Groups=1) (Lawless 1987).  Research shows that women’s group 
engage in peace activism more than any other group (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 
2012; Jansen 2006). A disadvantage of this data is that it doesn’t describe which groups are more 
influential which is likely to be indicated by the number of funds allocated to the group and how 
many members belong to each group. I think this variable is still worth including because 
countries with large numbers of women’s groups are more likely to have at least a few powerful 
organizations that influence peace processes because of the high support and mobilization of 
groups overall.   
I am not anticipating to find a strong and positive correlation between the number of 
women negotiators and the number of human rights provisions and gendered provisions, because 
I expect the negotiator’s level of influence to act as a mediating factor between these variables. 
Women negotiators are likely to be uninfluential in peace negotiations because their perspective 
is not valued by political elites (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The lack of acceptance for women’s 
presence in negotiations leads to exclusionary practices, which prevent women from being able to 
speak and vote to advance their preferences for human and women’s rights (Paffenholz et al. 
2018; Ellerby 2013). I predict that these situations will occur enough to skew the results of my 
statistical analysis.  
37 
 
After running my negative binomial regression to statistically evaluate the relationship 
and test this prediction, I will conduct a qualitative analysis with illustrative examples. I predict 
that influence will mediate the effects numbers of women negotiators have on numbers of 
provisions. The qualitative analysis will explain the inner workings behind instances in which the 
number of women does not positively influence the content of peace agreements. I will pull 
examples without a clear relationship between the number of women and number of peace 
agreement provisions, and will determine if influence was responsible for the lack of observable 
effect from the numbers of women negotiators on numbers of provisions. I determine if these 
peace processes had women negotiators with especially low in influence or high influence by 
comparing the average numbers of negotiators and the average numbers of provisions for human 
rights and gendered interests. I assume that peace processes with below average numbers of 
women negotiators and above average numbers of provisions have extremely influential women 
negotiators. I expect to find instances in which this small proportion of women negotiators gain 
influence by exploiting gender norms, and will look for the proposed mechanisms for gender 
norm exploitation in my theory. In my qualitative analysis, I select examples with highly 
influential women negotiators to evaluate the applicability of my theory that extreme influence 
can be achieved with the exploitation of gender norms despite small numbers of women 
negotiators. I also include peace processes with above the average percentage of women 
negotiators that had below average numbers of provisions on human rights and gendered 
provisions, because I assume that these processes will have especially uninfluential woman 
negotiators. In these peace processes, I look for instances of exclusionary practices are utilized by 
civilians and male negotiators. This is because I theorize that these practices hinder the ability for 
women negotiators to exercise influence over peace processes. I also use this time to discuss the 
presence of “megaphone” mechanisms, or the different variables identified in the literature to 
improve women’s influence (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Buchanan et al. 2012). These are often rules 
and procedures that can be created or altered to allow women more access to participation in 
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decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). I argue that these “megaphone” mechanisms will not allow 
women to become influential because they do not address the underlying causes of women’s 
exclusion, gender bias (Ellerby 2017). I look for the presence of these proposed mechanisms 
maximize influence in examples with uninfluential women negotiators as an effort to provide 
evidence that these mechanisms are not being effective. I use these illustrative examples to 
identify these proposed mechanisms for maximizing women’s influence in these peace processes 







In my theory, I do not expect to find a strong correlation between the number of women 
in negotiation roles and the number of provisions pertaining to human rights and women’s rights. 
I support the argument that women negotiators want support these issues, but assert that this does 
not mean that women negotiators can effectively influence the negotiation and shape peace 
agreement content. Case studies indicate that women’s participation in negotiations is largely 
inhibited by exclusionary practices from their male counterparts and other civilians (Paffenholz et 
al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This observed 
high rate of obstacles to women’s ability to participate in negotiations is why I expect the 
relationship between the number of women negotiators and the number of human rights and 
gendered provisions to be weakly correlated in my quantitative analysis. This predicted mediating 
variable is measured by women’s ability to speak or vote in negotiations, which is not currently 
quantifiable based on a lack of data availability. I begin testing my theory by evaluating the 
relationship between the number of women and peace agreement provisions, to confirm that there 
is a high frequency of negotiations with uninfluential women negotiators. After my analysis, I 
follow up with a qualitative study to demonstrate how the levels of influence that women 
negotiators have is what enables women to impact the content of peace agreements. I conducted 




I use count data in my quantitative analysis, which counts the number of provisions on 
human rights and gendered interests in my sample. The descriptive statistics for all variables 
included in my analysis are observable in the appendix in Table 8. Of the 906 agreements in my 
sample, only 860 cases could be included in the quantitative analysis. This is because of a lack of 
data for the socioeconomic conditions of South Sedan in recent years. In peace agreements signed 
before 2011, I used data from Sudan to fill gaps from missing data on South Sudan (Ellerby 2012; 
Hunt 2003). I chose to exclude the peace agreements signed in South Sudan after 2011, because 
South Sudan was recognized as an independent country at that time (Ellerby 2012; Hunt 2003).  I 
conducted two separate analyses with two separate models for each dependent variable. The 
strength of the correlation for the length variable was particularly high in my analyses, so I 
included an additional model that excludes this control variable and ceasefire agreements. 
Ceasefire agreements are typically the shortest agreements in a process, and are written to 
establish rules and procedures (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). 
Eliminating ceasefire agreements decreased the need to control for length and cut out agreements 
in the sample that were unlikely to have provisions on human rights and gendered interests. My 
results indicate the exclusion of the length variable may have been necessary, because many 
variables show significance in the second model (Lawless 1987). The statistical tables below 
show an Exponentiated β coefficient, so I could illustrate the size of the effect from each variable 
included on the numbers of human rights and gendered interests (UCLA:IDRE 2018). Results 
with the β coefficient are available in Table 9 for Human Rights provisions, and for gendered 
provisions in Table 10. 
The conditional means and variances for human rights provisions and gendered 
provisions by my independent variable (% of Woman Negotiators) is featured in Tables 1a and 
1b. I predict that the number of woman negotiators will not be a strong predictor of human rights 
provisions and gendered interests, and the results of Table 1a and 1b suggest some support for 
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this. This is because the mean value of the outcome variables (human rights and gendered 
provisions) does not show any pattern of growth or decline as the percentage of women 
negotiators increases (UCLA:IDRE 2018). Additionally, Tables 1a and 1b indicate that the data 
in the sample is over-dispersed, because the conditional means of human rights and gendered 
provisions for each level of woman negotiator is lower than the conditional variances 
(UCLA:IDRE 2018). This supports my choice of a Negative Binomial model for my analysis, 
which is well suited for over-dispersed count data (UCLA:IDRE 2018). 
Table 1a.  Mean Value of Human Rights                   Table 1b.  Mean Value of Gendered 
                         Provisions by Women                                              Provisions by Women 
Negotiators                                                                    Negotiators 
 
% Woman 
Negotiators Mean N Variance 
 
% Woman 
Negotiators Mean N Variance 
0 8.54 339 565.515  0 0.83 339 14.261 
2 34.64 14 3244.863  2 7.79 14 295.104 
3 21.83 6 2060.967  3 0.33 6 0.667 
4 3.53 34 106.681  4 0.35 34 1.084 
5 8.63 19 175.246  5 3.53 19 201.374 
8 17.23 40 2680.589  8 3.58 40 152.661 
9 4.83 36 36.143  9 3.78 36 47.721 
10 7.76 33 287.377  10 0.48 33 1.195 
11 3.46 39 16.413  11 0.05 39 0.05 
12 33.56 16 4998.796  12 5.31 16 166.496 
13 13.13 32 253.661  13 1.94 32 34.77 
15 8.91 22 173.706  15 5.77 22 157.898 
17 41 3 5043  17 10.67 3 341.333 
25 4 10 15.111  25 0 10 0 
30 23.67 15 6822.667  30 3.4 15 134.114 
32 3.23 114 47.204  32 0.31 114 1.684 
33 5.34 134 218.992  33 1.04 134 17.261 
Total 8.61 906 696.905  Total 1.43 906 37.999 
 
The results of my first negative binomial regression is reported in Table 2, which displays 
the relationship between the percentage of women negotiators and Human Rights provisions. I 
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conducted a chi-square test of independence, which compares the level of significance (p< .05) to 
the model’s overall pearson chi square value divided by the degrees of freedom (UCLA:IDRE 
2018; Lawless 1987).  Results indicated that the test statistics were well over .05, so the null 
hypothesis could be rejected for both models (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). The pearson 
chi square/d.f was 1.76 for Model 1 and reached a value of 6.04 for Model 2. This justified my 
reasoning to continue with my analyses because both models were shown to be appropriately 
specified. In other words, the number of variables in the model are sizeable, dispersed, and 
correlated enough to produce reportable results (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). I also 
referenced an omnibus test, for both the models included in Table 2 to further confirm the 
appropriateness of my model choice and significance of my results. The likelihood ratio chi 
square value in the omnibus test provides a test of the overall model compared to a model without 
any predictors (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). The results show that the models in Table 2 
are both a vast improvement over a null model, with Model 1 have a high likelihood ratio chi-
square value of 1006.01 p < .001 and Model 2 with a value of 169.84 p<.001. This reflects that 
the predictor variables do explain some variance in the number of human rights provisions in 
peace agreements and that Models 1 and 2 are worth interpreting.  
The independent variable in Table 2 is the percentage of women negotiators, which was 
found to be statistically insignificant in both models. This supports my hypothesis that there 
would not be an observable correlation between women negotiators and human rights provisions. 
My hypothesis stipulates that high numbers of women negotiators can lead to more peace 
agreement provisions on human rights, but that this effect heavily depends on the level of 
influence held by women negotiators. I do not predict that woman negotiators will have enough 
influence in most peace processes, so an analyses with a large sample should not show an 
observable correlation between these two variables. Model 1 in Table 2 only shows statistical 
significance for the control variable for length of peace agreement in pages (Length). From the 
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results of Model 1, we can expect the percent change in the incident rate of human rights 
provisions to increase by 7.1% ( p< .001) for every one unit increase in the number of pages 
within a peace agreement. Model 2 in Table 2 shows that the inclusion of the length variable may 
have skewed results, because more variables become statistically significant after all ceasefire 
agreements and length variable is excluded.  
Results from Model 2 in Table 2 show that the control variable for a country’s respect for 
human rights is statistically significant Exp(β)= 1.953 (p <. 001). Meaning that the incident rate 
for countries with below average respect for human rights (Human Rights=0) is .95 times the 
incident rate for the reference group (Cigranelli and Richards 2014; UCLA:IDRE 2018). I 
included this control variable expecting that more respect for human rights in a country would 
have positive implications for the number of provisions on human rights (Krause, Krause, and 
Branfors 2018; Paffenholz et al 2018). This variable goes against my expectations and those 
presented in the literature, because the Exponentiated β coefficient is above 1.0 in its 95% 
confidence interval for the lower level of the human rights variable (UCLA: IDRE 2018; Krause, 
Krause, and Branfors 2018; Paffenholz et al 2018). The increase in human rights provisions 
associated with lower levels of a country’s respect for human rights (Human Rights=0) could 
indicate that countries with high respect for human rights may have comparatively less of a need 
to include more provisions on this topic. Also, many peace agreement provisions are not 
implemented well, so a higher frequency of human rights provisions may not actually be related 
to a country’s desire to improve human rights conditions (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Rather, the 
inclusion of many provisions on human rights could be an effort to signal to international 
organizations that these countries want to improve conditions for human rights as a means to gain 




Table 2. Negative Binomial Regression Results: Human Rights Provisions 
Dependent variable: 













































N 860 707 
*p < .05;  ** p  <  .01; *** p  <  .001. 
 
 
The variable for the number of women’s groups also goes against expectations in Model 
2. The countries with less than the average number of woman’s groups (Women’s groups=0), 
have an incident rate of .596 times the incident rate for the excluded variable representing the 
countries with above the median number of women’s groups (Women’s groups=1) holding all 
other variables constant (UCLA:IDRE 2018). I predicted that the Exp(β) coefficient would be 
below 1.0 because the literature shows that many women’s groups can be highly influential on 
peace and can push for the inclusion of more provisions on certain issues and for the agreement to 
be signed (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This variable could be presenting in 
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opposite directions than predicted because the number of women’s groups may not be as 
important as the strength, size, and activeness of the women’s groups with a country at the year 
the peace agreement is signed. The control variable for the number of births per woman (Birth 
Rate), was predicted to have a Exp(β) coefficient below zero. This assertion was based on 
common theoretical propositions in the literature, which argued that higher rates of births per 
women indicate lower levels of women’s inclusion in the public sector, and more restrictions for 
women wanting to take on roles and positions outside of the home (Paffenholz et al. 2018; True 
and Riveros-Morales 2019). When women have more access to reproductive control this can 
mean that more women have more choices in terms of professional vocations. However, when 
you consider the specific contexts of the developing countries this assertion can become 
problematic (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Ellerby 2017). Forced sterilization is a common practice in 
developing countries undergoing conflict, which could also lower birth rates and be more closely 
related to poor conditions for women and human rights (Ellerby 2017; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). 
My control variable for Gender Quotas was the only statistically significant control variable that 
followed my predictions, showing that the percentage change in the incident rate of human rights 
provisions is a 1.6% increase for every one unit increase in the percentage mandated for women 
in electoral gender quotas at the year the peace agreement was signed.  
I also provide a correlation matrix of all the variables included in quantitative analysis for 
human rights provisions below in Table 3. This matrix allows me to detect multicollinearity in my 
control and independent variable, or if any variables are too closely related (UCLA:IDRE 2018). 
The inclusion of independent and control variables that are correlated to each other can diminish 
effects of these variables on the dependent variable, misrepresenting relationships of the variables 
in the model (UCLA:IDRE 2018). The results of Table 3 do not show any correlation coefficients 


















(Intercept) 1.000 -0.655 -0.377 -0.461 -0.065 -0.230 -0.231 -0.852 -0.078 
Woman 
Negotiators 
-0.655 1.000 0.542 0.418 0.037 0.336 0.081 0.422 -0.249 
Human 
 Rights=0 
-0.377 0.542 1.000 0.008 0.003 0.067 -0.112 0.201 -0.079 
Woman’s 
Groups=0 
-0.461 0.418 0.008 1.000 -0.012 0.173 -0.252 0.260 0.259 
Length -0.065 0.037 0.003 -0.012 1.000 -0.123 -0.091 -0.062 0.043 
Quota -0.230 0.336 0.067 0.173 -0.123 1.000 0.172 0.240 -0.541 
Birth Rate -0.231 0.081 -0.112 -0.252 -0.091 0.172 1.000 0.091 -0.364 
Workforce -0.852 0.422 0.201 0.260 -0.062 0.240 0.091 1.000 -0.068 
Women’s 
Representation 
-0.078 -0.249 -0.079 0.259 0.043 -0.541 -0.364 -0.068 1.000 
 
My second negative binomial regression results are reported in Table 4, with a dependent 
variable measuring the number of gendered provisions in a peace agreement. The results of the 
chi-square independence test for both models included in Table 4 had values well over the .05 
value of significance, indicating that I could reject the null hypothesis and that the data was well 
suited to the model (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). In addition, I conducted an omnibus test, 
the high values and significance of the likelihood ratio chi-squares for Model 1 (963.35 p < .001) 
and Model 2 (283.93 p<.001) show that my model describes more variance than the null model 
(UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987).  Results from Table 1b show a much higher conditional 
variance than conditional means for gendered provisions in each level of percentages of woman 
than negotiators, indicating over-dispersion of data (UCLA:IDRE 2018). The results from the 
hypothesis tests and the conditional means table indicate that my data is well suited to the model 
and my data is worth interpreting for Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 
1987).  
Table 4, which tests the relationship between the number of women negotiators and the 
number of gendered provisions in the resulting peace agreement, had mixed results for my 
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hypothesis. The first model includes peace agreements of all different types and the length 
variable, and does not find statistical significance for women negotiators as predicted. Model 2 
contradicts my hypothesis, finding that the percent change of the incident rate for gendered 
provisions increases by 1.2% for every one unit increase in the percentage of women negotiators. 
The second model does estimate a small effect from women negotiators and this correlation is of 
the lowest statistical significance in comparison to all other variables included. My control 
variables are meant to represent various measures of women’s status and economic development, 
so it makes sense that these variables more strongly predict provisions on gendered interests 
rather than human rights. My argument that countries with poorer conditions for human rights is 
supported in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 4 both finding that Human Rights=0 has more than 
double times the incident rate for gendered provisions than for the excluded reference group of 
countries with above average scores for respect for human rights (Human Rights=1). Similarly, 
Women’s Groups and Birth rate continue to present against predictions in results. This further 
supports my argument that these variables are not properly capturing the effects of strong active 
women’s groups over large numbers, and the consequences of forced sterilization (Paffenholz et 






















































N 860 707 
*p < .05;  ** p  <  .01; *** p  <  .001. 
 
 
The control variable for Gender Quotas was statistically significant and the percent 
change of the incident rate of gendered provisions is a 3.2 % increase for every one unit in in the 
percentage mandated for women in electoral gender quotas at the year the peace agreement was 
signed. I argue earlier that the inclusion of more human rights provisions may be motivated by 
country leaders with a poor reputation, looking to signal to international organizations that they 
are making efforts to improve (Ellerby 2017; Domingo et al. 2015). The adoption of gender 
quotas can also be a way for country leaders to make an observable effort to improve gender 
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equality, as a means to gain favor, aid, and assistance from international groups that give support 
to countries that prioritize this value (Domingo et al. 2015; Ellerby 2017). Likewise, country 
leaders will include large amounts of women in peace processes to show international 
organizations that they are making steps to improve gender equality (Paffenholz et al. 2016; 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). It could be that these same countries adopting 
gender quotas are appointing large amounts of woman negotiators and writing lots of gendered 
provisions as a means to signal more commitment to gender equality.  
However, the statistical significance of % of women in the workforce Exp(β)= 1.014 (p 
<. 01) and the % of Women in the Legislative Branch Exp(β)= 1.053 (p <. 001) in Model 2 
indicates that the correlation between number of women negotiators and quotas to gendered 
provisions may be more than just an empty gesture. The number of countries that included 
gendered provisions was much smaller than those that passed human rights provisions. The 
significance of these control variables for women’s status amongst this smaller pool of 
agreements that included gendered provisions may indicate that countries with more gender 
equitable conditions may be doing more to include, protect, and recognize women.   
The correlation matrix of all the variables included in quantitative analysis for gendered 
rights provisions is reported in Table 5. The results of Table 5 do not show any correlation 
coefficients between variables that are greater than .7, giving no indication of multicollinearity in 
my model (UCLA:IDRE 2018). I predicted that the correlation between the number of women 
negotiators and human rights and gendered interests would not be represented in my quantitative 
results, because common finding that women negotiators are often unable to speak or vote in 
peace negotiations despite their seat at the table (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016; 





Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Gendered Provisions Results 
 
The relationship between women negotiators and human rights has lacked empirical 
evaluation in the research on women and peace, and the results from my quantitative analysis 
support my theory that women negotiations are not able to significantly change the number of 
human rights provisions. Research on women negotiators and gendered provisions has found that 
peace processes with women negotiators will have more gendered provisions than peace 
processes without women negotiators (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Swiss and Anderson 
2014). However, does the proportion of women negotiators matter? The results from Model 2 in 
Table 4 indicate that increases in the number of women negotiators (Exp(β)= 1.012 (p <. 05), is a 
statistically significant predictor of provisions on gendered interests. The stronger statistical 
significance of all variables in Table 4 compared to Table 2, give support to the argument that 
women’s status and presence matters more for gendered provisions than for human rights 
provisions (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). In my literature review, I 

















(Intercept) 1.000 -0.514 -0.231 -0.359 -0.060 -0.137 -0.299 -0.817 -0.200 
Woman 
Negotiators 
-0.514 1.000 0.496 0.297 0.013 0.125 -0.013 0.242 -0.141 
Human 
Rights=0 
-0.231 0.496 1.000 -0.061 0.118 -0.050 -0.321 0.086 -0.064 
Women’s 
Groups=0 
-0.359 0.297 -0.061 1.000 -0.057 0.236 -0.343 0.247 0.252 
Length -0.060 0.013 0.118 -0.057 1.000 -0.120 -0.042 -0.151 0.052 
Quota -0.137 0.125 -0.050 0.236 -0.120 1.000 0.108 0.136 -0.446 
Birth Rate -0.299 -0.013 -0.321 -0.343 -0.042 0.108 1.000 0.141 -0.297 
Workforce -0.817 0.242 0.086 0.247 -0.151 0.136 0.141 1.000 0.056 
Women’s 
Rep 
-0.200 -0.141 -0.064 0.252 0.052 -0.446 -0.297 0.056 1.000 
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2002; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women negotiators may be more unified in their votes on women’s 
issues than human rights issues, making the number of women negotiators more directly 
descriptive of the number of votes for women’s issues specifically (Paffenholz et al. 2018; 
Anderlini 2014). Additionally, women negotiators may be included in negotiations as members of 
a women’s coalition (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Anderlini 2014; Buchanan et al. 2012). Negotiators 
appointed to serve solely on a women’s coalition may feel obligated to vote and push for issues 
that belong to this particular category, making these actors’ level of influence fairly limited on 
issues outside of gendered interests (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Ellerby 2017). 
I argue that women are more likely to support the inclusion of human rights and women’s 
interests, and that there is strength in numbers of likeminded delegates in any voting body. 
However, a dominant proportion of women will not be able to shape peace agreement content to 
match their own preferences without the ability to vote, speak, and influence the overall 
negotiation process. Based on case study research, I predicted that a weak correlation between 
numbers of women and provisions will be found because the majority of agreements in my 
sample will have uninfluential negotiators due to exclusionary practices from civilians and 
political elites (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015). In peace processes where civilians and political elites engage in these 
behaviors, I am predicting that even large proportions of women negotiators can coincide with 
agreements containing little to no provisions on human rights and gendered interests. Despite this 
opposition to women’s participation in peace, I predict that women can overcome these barriers 
by exploiting the same gender norms responsible for women’s exclusion in the first place (Ellerby 
2017). In these peace processes, women exert substantial effects on the peace process by 
emphasizing their unique role in society as women, stressing the need for protection by 
publicizing their vulnerability, and by using normative expectations of modesty to their advantage 
(Blocking exists without fear of being touched or forcibly removed, threatening to actively 
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undressing publicly out of protest). I theorize that these mechanisms will enable women to 
successfully push for the inclusion of many provisions on human rights and gendered interests, 
despite small numbers of descriptive representation. This is an additional explanation for why I 
predicted the relationship between women negotiators and provisions would be unobservable, 
because peace processes with small numbers of highly influential women negotiators would 
coincide with large numbers of human rights provisions. So far, my analysis has provided some 
support for my hypothesis, showing no correlation between the percentage of woman negotiators 
and the number of human rights provisions and mixed results for gendered provisions. However, I 
have not provided any evidence to support the conclusion that the lack of correlation between 
women and the consideration for human rights and gendered interests is caused by low or high 
levels of influence. In the next section, I will provide a qualitative analysis to further illustrate the 










In my theory, I argue that women are inclined to support human rights and gendered 
interests, so I expect the mediating effects of influence to be present in peace processes with 
nonlinear relationships between the numbers of women negotiators and the numbers of peace 
agreement provisions. To further illustrate my predictions, I have provided an illustration of the 
thresholds for peace processes where women have high and low influence on a scatter plots for 
human rights provisions in Figure 1 and gendered provisions in Figure 2. In Figures 1 and 2 the 
green dotted line represents the average number of woman negotiators and the yellow dotted line 
represents the average number of human rights in Figure 1 and gendered provisions in Figure 2. 
The scatter plot in Figures 1 and 2 collapses all 906 peace agreements into 32 peace processes 
and shows the average number of human rights and gendered provisions within all agreements in 
the peace process. I choose to include the 46 peace agreements from conflicts in South Sedan 
after 2011 that weren’t present in my quantitative analysis, because I was only missing data on 
country demographics and women’s status for those peace agreements. These peace processes 
should be included in these figures because there is reliable data on the number of peace 
agreements and women involved in these negotiations in my sample. While looking at the 
scatterplots, it is important to note that the majority of peace processes included in my sample 
have less than twenty percent of women negotiators.  
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While this is representative of most peace processes today, which have less than 20% women 
negotiators ,this is a potential disadvantage because my sample may not accurately represent the 
effects that large proportions of women negotiators have on peace processes. There are very few 
peace processes in my sample with over 20 percent of women negotiators, and these processes all 
have below average numbers of provisions thus low levels of influence. Case studies argue that 
that most of the peace processes in my sample appointed the sizeable proportion of women 
negotiators as an effort to signal commitments to gender equality to international organizations, 
but not as an effort to share power or improve women’s inclusion (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). If peace processes were to 
implement over 20% women negotiators as a genuine effort to improve conditions for women and 
for human rights, a sizeable amount of women negotiators could potentially have extensive voting 
power and influence (Paffenholz et al 2018). It is known if there are enough peace processes with 
over 20% of influential women negotiators in the real world, to render my sample 
misrepresentative. Case studies show that the majority of large proportions of women negotiators 
included in negotiations lack influence, which supports the representativeness of my sample 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012).  
My decision to collapse all 906 peace agreements in my sample into 32 peace processes 
in Figures 1 and 2, controls for the difference in page length between agreements (Krause, 
Krause, and Branfors 2018; Ellerby 2013). This is important because length was shown to have a 
very strong correlation to human rights and gendered provisions. I have drawn an estimated trend 
line for the effect that women negotiators would have on the number of agreement provisions if 
there were no obstacles or anomalies to the level of influence of women negotiators. This 
estimated trend line for numbers of provisions without mediating effects from low or high 




Figure 1. Scatterplot: Average Number of Human Rights Provisions per Agreement 
 




The purple shaded region in Figures 1 and 2 represents peace processes with low 
influence. I assume that the peace processes that fell within the purple region in Figures 1 and 2 
had especially uninfluential women negotiators because I assume that women negotiators would 
vote to support human rights and gendered interests. Therefore, peace processes above average 
numbers of women negotiators and below average numbers of agreement provisions on human 
rights and gendered interests must be a product of women negotiators being unable to vote and 
support their preferences. I expect to find observable effects from exclusionary practices from 
male negotiators and the public, because this has been found to be a large barrier to women’s 
influence in case studies (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; 
Buchanan et al. 2012). I strategically chose illustrative examples from the peace processes that 
fell within the purple region in Figures 1 and 2 because I expect to find easily observable 
mediating effects from influence on the relationship of numbers of women negotiators and 
provisions on human rights and gendered interests. The orange shaded region in Figures 1 and 2 
represents peace processes with high influence. I assume that the peace processes that fell within 
the orange region in Figures 1 and 2 had highly influential women negotiators because of that 
large number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests included in the final 
agreement without a lot of voting power from the small proportion of women negotiators. I 
assume that women negotiators would vote to support human rights and gendered interests. I 
expect to find women exploiting gender norms in these examples, because I theorize that the 
exploitation of normative expectations of gender allows women to be especially effective at 
increasing the consideration of human rights and gendered interests in peace. I strategically chose 
illustrative examples from the peace processes that fell within the orange region in Figures 1 and 
2, because I expect to find easily observable mediating effects from the high levels influence in 
the women negotiators on the relationship of numbers of women negotiators and provisions on 
human rights and gendered interests.  
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The peace processes chosen as my illustrative examples are The Darfur Peace Process 
(2006) and the Yemeni Civil War of (2011) and The Arta Peace Process in Liberia (2003), and 
the Nepalese Insurgency (2006) (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These peace processes all present either in the orange 
shaded region (high influence) or the purple shaded region (low influence) in Figures 1 and 2. I 
will also evaluate the validity of my theory and assertions in reference to the selected peace 
processes by identifying if the women with unusually high levels of influence engaged in my 
causal mechanism of exploiting gender norms to their advantage. One of my largest critiques of 
current literature on women’s influence in peace negotiations pertained to the “megaphone” 
mechanisms, in which rules and procedures could be altered to allow women more access to 
participation in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Table 6 presents a comparison of the averages of 
negotiators and provisions between the illustrative examples and the overall sample. 
Table 6: Qualitative Analysis Descriptive Statistics 




Average Number of  
Human Rights 
Provisions per  
Agreement 
Average Number of 
Gendered 
Provisions per  
Agreement 
Total Sample 10.22% 11.28 2.38 
Accra Peace Process 0.00% 5.03 .043 
Darfur Peace Process 8.00% 31.10 6.95 
Yemeni Civil War 2011 
 
30.00% 1.33 2.67 
 
My first example, the Accra Peace Process shows that women can exercise influence on 
peace processes by exploiting gender norms, while controlling for the numbers of women 
negotiators. The Accra Peace Process in Liberia (2003) did not have any women acting as 
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negotiators, but it is important to note that 17% of women were granted the status of observers 
(O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Observers cannot vote or speak in negotiations, 
granting certainty that the women in the negotiation room could not exercise influence, based on 
my conceptualization of influence (Paffenholz et al. 2016). This sizeable amount of women in the 
negotiation room was thanks to the involvement of many international organizations including the 
Women in Peacebuilding Network (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The literature argues that the 
extensive amounts of resources and supports women had in the Accra Peace Process (2003) 
allowed women to exercise influence on the peace process (Paffenholz et al. 2018). However, the 
average number of human rights provisions in all the peace agreements in this process was half of 
the total sample’s average. Even worse, Liberia’s average of gendered provisions was .043, less 
than a fourth of the sample’s average. The level of influence from the women present in the room 
was extremely limited, because women observers were not granted the privilege to vote or speak 
during decision-making discussions. Women from outside of the room exercised far more 
influence on the peace process however, and pressured negotiators to sign the final agreement by 
threatening to publicly undress in full view of the negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). The threat of the women had so much weight due to cultural 
contexts, which allowed women to become a major influence on the promotion of peace 
(Paffenholz et al. 2016: O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). 
The second example illustrates that small numbers of women negotiators can be 
extremely influential in negotiations by exploiting gender norms, leading to large numbers of 
provisions on human rights and gendered provisions. The Darfur Peace Process in South Sudan 
(2006) had the highest averages of provisions on human rights and gendered interests per 
agreement in my sample but had less than a tenth of women negotiators (Ellerby 2012; Buchanan 
et al. 2012; Hunt 2003). Women in Sudan experienced very high levels of opposition and hostility 
in response to their inclusion in the peace process, and had very little resources at their disposal 
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(Hunt 2003; Ogunsanya 2007). The literature would predict that women’s level of influence 
would be especially low here, based on the country’s socioeconomic situation and lack of quotas 
or protection from institutional procedures (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015; World Bank 2017).  
 Despite this, women in Sudan were able to influence the peace process by emphasizing 
their vulnerability and need for protection and by violating normative expectations of modesty. 
Women in Sudan lacked resources, freedoms, and inclusion from other actors involved in the 
peace process (Hunt 2003; Ellerby 2012). In Sudanese culture, viewing a women relative in the 
nude is considered a curse (Ogunsanya 2007). Sudanese woman used this normative expectation 
of modesty attached to their own bodies to disarm their relatives by threatening to undress 
(Ogunsaya 2007). Women also drew attention to the violence and abductions of child soldiers by 
marching naked (Hunt 2003). To draw international attention to the conflict, Women in Sudan 
spoke publicly about the high rates of sexual violence they endured, and the violence to their 
children (Hunt 2003). These actions are linked to the strength of the content within the resulting 
agreements, which were written in assistance with the United Nations (Paffenholz et al. 2016; 
PA-X Peace Agreement Database 2016). Women in Sudan did not have contextual or procedural 
conditions that allowed them to be influential negotiators, but were able to get support for the 
inclusion of provisions that address the high rates of physical and sexual violence through their 
radical demonstrations and peace activism (Ogunsaya 2007; Hunt 2003). 
My next illustrative example comes from peace agreements in the Yemeni Civil Conflicts 
of 2011, which were far below the average of the sample. The agreements in this process had an 
average of 2.67 human rights provisions and zero gendered provisions. I chose to include this 
peace process to support my critique of “megaphones” or changes in rules or procedures to 
maximize the influence of women negotiators (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016: 
O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).The procedures in place in Yemen (2011) were 
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heavily favorable for women. For starters, the inclusion of women was heavily supported by the 
United Nations special advisor at the time, Jamal Benomar (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015). After many efforts to push for women’s inclusion in an all male process, a 30% 
quota for the negotiation was passed for 30 and an additional 40 reserved seats for a separate 
woman’s coalition (O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). A proportion of women this 
size should have provided the women with an extreme advantage in terms of veto power, this 
advantage was heightened by a procedural rule requiring 90% approval for resolutions to be 
adopted (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The negotiation delegates were split into working groups and a 
woman was required to hold one of the four leadership positions available in each group. 
Literature on the peace process in Yemen (2011) makes it very clear that opposition to women’s 
inclusion was very high despite the quota (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015). The women negotiators were threatened, attacked, and shamed for participating 
and especial contention was directed at participants who pushed for women’s issues (Buchanan et 
al 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). In an attempt to counter all of the opposition, women’s 
international organizations and the United Nations held training sessions and facilitated 
workshops to prepare women to contribute in a meaningful way (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The 
procedural and structural characteristics of this peace process were hand crafted to support the 
inclusion of marginalized groups and women (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, 
and Paffenholz 2015). However, this did not stop the other negotiators from being highly 
contentious to their involvement in the process (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, 
and Paffenholz 2015). Even if women did choose to vote despite threats and attacks, other 
negotiators found a way to get around all the rules and started holding meetings at night. When 
women tried to attend meetings at night unattended, pictures of them were posted online calling 
them “dishonorable” for being unaccompanied at night (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O’Reilly, 
Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Women in the peace process had the opportunity to be 
heard, but the procedural protections did not make other actors in the political process more 
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willing to listen. The peace processes selected for my illustrative examples showed evidence of 
mediating effects from influence on the ability for women negotiators to increase the number of 
































Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women place a greater 
consideration for the needs of the community during the peacebuilding process (de La Rey and 
Mckay 2006; El-Bushra 2007; Stone 2015). I theorized that women’s preferences in support of 
human rights and gendered interests will not cause a greater amount of provisions on these issues, 
because of the frequent occurrence where women negotiators lack the ability to influence peace 
processes. My results provided support for my hypothesis, showing that the correlation between 
women negotiators and human rights provisions was of no statistical significance. However, my 
results also showed that the numbers of women negotiators may be more strongly correlated to 
gendered peace agreement provisions. This may be due the greater inclusion of women in 
negotiations as a part of a woman’s coalition. This could cause a stronger correlation for woman 
negotiators to gendered provisions because women negotiators may feel more obligated to 
advocate for gendered interests if they belong specifically to women’s coalition in the negotiation 
room (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Additionally, a 
woman’s coalition may be more likely to vote in unison and have more influence on women’s 
interests than on other human rights interests (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and 
Paffenholz 2015).  Additionally, the results from my statistical analysis indicated that the length 
of the peace agreement was a very important determinant of whether human rights provisions and 




Future studies in this area should not included ceasefire agreements in their sample, 
because these documents typically lack content beyond procedural guidelines (Bell and Rourke 
2010). 
My quantitative results went against expectations when it showed that countries with less 
respect for human rights were more likely to include provisions on human rights and gendered 
interests. This could indicate that countries with more human rights violations may include more 
provisions on these issues as an effort to correct and improve current conditions. One of the 
countries with the largest amounts of peace agreement provisions was South Sedan in the Darfur 
Peace Process (2006), this peace agreement is widely acknowledged for being very poorly carried 
out (Ellerby 2012; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Literature on peace agreements shows that the poor 
implementation of peace agreement provisions designed to improve human rights and women’s 
rights are the norm, not the rarity (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). It may be that these provisions are 
passed to gain favor and funding from international actors, rather than as a genuine effort to 
improve human rights and women’s rights (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Paffenholz et al. 2018).  
I predicted that the lack of correlation between the number of women negotiators and 
numbers of provisions would be caused by mediating effects from influence. I expected that a lot 
of peace process in my sample would have peace processes where few women negotiators 
produced large numbers of provisions with high levels of influence, or where many women 
lacked influence and signed an agreement with very little provisions on peace. I was able to 
illustrate that many of the peace processes in my sample fit this description. In my analysis of the 
Yemen Peace Process (2011), I showed that the large numbers of women negotiators were unable 
to influence peace agreement content due to exclusionary practices from their male counterparts 
and other members in their community. My analysis of the Darfur Peace Process (2006), allowed 
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me to present evidence that women can exploit normative expectations of gender to overcome 
these obstacles to their level of influence in peace negotiations. This supported my argument that 
small numbers of women can create peace agreements with large numbers of peace agreement 
provisions on human rights and gendered interests when they utilize the three proposed 
mechanisms in my theory. In an ideal scenario, the level of influence peace negotiators would be 
quantifiable and easily accessible data. Interpretations of women’s influence in case studies are 
inconsistent and hard to compare between peace processes (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et 
al. 2012; O’Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Future research should look for 
instances in which women are excluded from voting, and how this correlates with the number of 
peace agreement provisions on human rights and gendered interests. Information on the number 
of women negotiators and the extent to which each negotiator could participate and vote is 
especially lacking for individual peace agreements, rather than just within a peace process 
overall. Future research can also examine the extent to which human rights and gendered  
provisions are being translated into actual policy and serving as a means to improve conditions 
for human rights and for women in post-conflict situations. In order for gendered provisions and 
human rights to serve as a causal mechanism for positive effects on the durability, these 
provisions must create change to the social, economic, and political fabric within a country. 
Without the implementation of these provisions, little contributions can be made in terms of the 
concept positive peace (Lederach 1997; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). Meaning 
that the quality of peace will not improve because trust in the ruling regime and cooperation 
between groups within society will not be follow the inclusion of human rights and gendered 
provisions if they serve as empty promises, rather than a means to serve the people (Lederach 
1997; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). This study aimed to evaluate the 
relationship between women and human rights provisions because it is often identified as an 
underlying causal mechanism for the finding that women’s presence in peace leads to more 
durable peace (Stone 2015; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). My results and conclusions offer 
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very little support for this widely acknowledged yet untested underlying causal mechanism (Stone 
2015; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). More research needs to be conducted to evaluate why 
women have positive effects on peace, because these arguments inform decisions of country 
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Table 7. Cases Included in Quantitative Analysis 




ABUJA PEACE PROCESS Liberia 0 0 
ACCRA PEACE PROCESS Ivory Coast 0 0 
ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS Burundi 0 2 
BONN PEACE PROCESS Afghanistan 9 9 
BALKAN CONFLICT 1 Bosnia 0 0 
BOUGAINVILLE CONFLICT  Papua New Guinea 7 4 
CHAPULTEPEC PEACE PROCESS El Salvador 12 13 
COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR Colombia 2 33 
BALKAN CONFLICT 2 Croatia 0 11 
DARFUR PEACE PROCESS Sudan 0 8 
EAST TIMOR PEACE PROCESS Indonesia 0 0 
FREE ACEH PEACE PROCESS Indonesia 8 0 
GUATEMALAN CIVIL WAR Guatemala 11 10 
HONDURAS COUP D’ÉTAT Honduras 33 0 
JUBA PEACE PROCESS Uganda 0 9 
KENYAN POST-ELECTORAL 
VIOLENCE 
Kenya 0 25 
BALKAN CONFLICT 3 Kosovo 0 3 
LIBREVILLE CONFLICT CAF 0 0 
MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS Philippines 32 35 
NAVAISHA PEACE PROCESS South Sudan 0 0 
NEPALESE INSURGENCY  Nepal 33 33 
NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT Ireland 10 10 
OHRID PEACE PROCESS Macedonia 0 5 
OSLO PEACE PROCESS Philippines 25 32 
SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR  Sierra Leone 0 0 
SOMALI CIVIL WAR Somalia 0 0 
SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT South Sudan 15 15 
SUN CITY PEACE PROCESS DRC 5 12 
TUAREG WARS  Mali 5 5 
YEMENI CIVIL WAR 1994 Yemen 30 30 
YEMENI CIVIL WAR 2011 Yemen 30 30 
ZIMBABWEAN POST-
ELECTORAL CRISIS 
Zimbabwe 17 17 
71 
 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Quantitative Analysis 







860 0.00 322.00 8.66 26.97 725.97 
Gendered  
Provisions 
860 0.00 63.00 1.42 6.10 37.23 















860 0.00 33.00 12.98 13.73 187.77 
       
Human Rights  
Index=0 
418      
Women’s 
Organizations=0 
422      
Length of Peace 
Agreement 
860 1.00 245.00 7.24 19.64 385.65 
Birth Rate 860 1.47 8.61 3.75 1.84 3.32 
% of Women 
Workforce 
860 8.13 52.86 38.32 9.47 89.73 
Women’s  
Representation 

















Table 9. Beta Coefficient Regression Results: Human Rights Provisions 
Dependent variable: 




































% of Women’s 









































































Candidate for the Degree of Political Science 
 
Master of Arts 
 









Completed the requirements for the Master of Arts in Political Science at 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May, 2019. 
 
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
Oklahoma in December, 2016. 
 
Experience:   
• Spring 2017. Research Assistant with Dr. Rebekah Herrick. Duties include 
data collection and analysis.  
• Fall 2015, Fall 2016- Fall 2018-Present Teaching Assistant/Discussion 
Leader, with Dr. Eric French and Dr. Amber Dickinson. Course: Political 
Science 1113, “Introduction to American Government” Oklahoma State 
University. Duties included: teaching two break-out discussion sections 
independent from lecture once a week, creating a grading discussion 
assignments, grading tests, serving as the initial point of contact and source of 
assistance for students. 
• Spring 2017-Fall 2018 Teaching Workshop Coordinator, responsible for 
organizing teaching workshops for all teaching assistants within the political 
science department. 
 
Professional Memberships:  
• Spring 2018-Present, Phi Kappa Phi, Honor Society 
•  Fall 2017- Present, Pi Sigma Alpha, Political Science Honor Society 
